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Introduction
On April 25, 2001, members of the National Association of
Broadcasters ("NAB") and International Webcasting Association
("IWA") met in Las Vegas for the annual NAB convention. Many of
those in attendance gathered for a highlight-the IWA panel
discussion, Media on the Net from Small Streams to a Sea of Revenue.
The message was clear: music webcasting' was no longer the domain
of renegade "dot.com" entrepreneurs. These panelists, in fact,
represented industry leaders, with Microsoft delivering the keynote
address and commentary provided by Yahoo, Arbitron, Qwest
Digital Media, Internet Wire, and RealNetworks, among others.2
Actually, the tide had shifted back in October 2000 when
entertainment giant Bertelsmann A.G. broke ranks with the
recording industry to form a strategic alliance with online music
provider, Napster. After that, the race began to "snap up online
businesses that either own the most rights to independent artists, the
best technology infrastructure or the greatest amount of eyeballs or
better still eardrums."3 All of the major record labels that, a year
prior, had been engaged in legal battles with Napster,4 were now
jumping on the online music bandwagon. In April 2001, a
collaboration between RealNetworks, EMI, BMG and Warner
promised a music subscription service called MusicNet; Viacom's
MTVi planned to offer a streaming/digital-download service in
conjunction with all five major labels; and even Microsoft issued a
statement saying that it, too, would become involved in digital music.'
1. "Webcastings" is defined as:
real-time transmission of encoded video under the control of the
server to multiple recipients who all receive the same content at the
same time. This is in contract to normal web browsing which is con-
trolled from the browser by individual users and may take arbitrarily
long to deliver a complete document.
<http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=webcasting> (accessed Mar. 27, 2002).
2. Additional panelists represented digital Spirit, Cidera, Avid Technology,
PRIMEDIA, The Fantastic Corporation, and Edison Research. Streaming Media is a
Growing Profitable Internet Business Model, Reports The International Webcasting
Association at NAB, Internet Wire 1 (April 25, 2001).
3. Robert Norton, Music Moguls Look to Online Future <http://www.radio
horizon.com/index.php3?fcw=displayarticle&ID=1743> (accessed June 4, 2001).
4. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
5. Julene Snyder, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back <http://www.thestandard.
com/article/0,1902,27099,00.html> (June 14, 2001).
By July 2001, Bertelsmann announced it would acquire Myplay.com,
and Vivendi Universal purchased MP3.com.6 Universal and Sony also
promised that their jointly-owned Pressplay system would become
active in September.7 As the industry knew by this time, webcasting
held great promise not only for its ability to allow consumers to listen
to music and radio over the Internet, but also to stream video and
other media, as well.'
Unfortunately, at present, webcasting is in a position akin to the
old saying, "All dressed up, with no place to go." As IWA Chair,
Peggy Miles, told Congress in June 2000, "Despite all of this promise,
however, the reality is that American businesses and consumers are
unable at present to reap the full benefits of streaming media
technology." 9 The reason? No one has yet been able to agree on the
meaning of the copyright laws related to webcast licensing and fees or
how to define and treat new technological advances, innovations and
uses. As a result, the major industry players continue to hold back
until a consensus is reached. In the past, those who dared place a toe
into the water found themselves slapped With nasty letters or lawsuits.
This situation has resulted in an ongoing and escalating legal war over
licensing and fees, complete with villains and heroes, shifting
allegiances, backroom deals and moveable fronts, pitting the music
industry against itself. As the record labels, publishers, radio stations,
and webcasters fight with each other in and out of court, as well as
petition Congress and the Copyright Office over interpretations of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"),1° they leave
behind the artists and consumers as casualties while a promising new
technology sits idly by.
6. The purchase price was announced at $372 million. Ipsos-Reid research released
in June 2001 revealed that sixty percent of Internet users between the ages of 18-24
downloaded music online; Informa Media Group also estimated that online music sales
would hit $9.7 billion by 2006. Norton, supra n. 2.
7. Brad King, Writers' Song Sung Blue <http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,45510,00.html> (accessed July 25, 2001).
8. As IWA Chair, Peggy Miles, stated in her Congressional address, webcasting can
provide real-time access, over a home or business computer, to television and radio
broadcasts, including public safety announcements, emergency information, and breaking
news stories; deliver on-line, real-time educational programs; allow consumers the security
of being able to view their homes, children, or daycare centers via remote video webcasts;
connect people living in remote locations without cable or satellite television; and provide
television and film broadcasts. Testimony before Congress, June 2000. International
Webcasters Association, IWA News <http://www.webcasters. org/news> (accessed Oct. 12,
2001).
9. Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 1, 112 Stat. 2860,2860 (1998).
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This article will provide background into the history of the
copyright law as it relates to music webcasting, including the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 ("DPRA")" and
the DMCA, explain the various forms of copyright protection held in
recorded sound performances and its relation to online transmissions,
discuss the history of the complex, legal situation which has resulted,
new developments surrounding the proposed Music Online
Competition Act ("MOCA"), and offer commentary and suggestions.
I
Chapter One: Two Copyrights Embodied in One Musical
Recording: A Formula for Conflict
When an artist goes into the studio to make a musical recording,
two copyrightable works are actually embodied and created in the
process under the Copyright Act: the musical work copyright and the
sound recording copyright. 2 The first copyrightable work is embodied
in the actual musical composition, consisting of the written notes and
lyrics. This is referred to as the "musical work."'3 Usually the
songwriter and/or the songwriter's publisher hold the copyright on
this musical work. Copies of the musical work, such as sheet music,
are sold or licensed to others who wish to perform it publicly, as well.
Royalty money is then collected on these individual sales or uses."
If a performance of the musical work happens to be broadcast
over the airwaves such as by a radio station, each play is also worth
money, in the form of royalties, to the songwriter and publisher.
Unfortunately, it is difficult for songwriters and publishers to keep
track of and collect these royalties, particularly since broadcasts occur
in many different locations and at various times. In an effort to
11. Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 1, 109 Stat. 336, 336 (1995).
12. 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a) (LEXIS L. Publg. 2001).
13. Id. § 102(a)(2). Under section 106 of the Copyright Act, the copyright owner has
the exclusive right to do and authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending; (4) in the
case of... musical ... works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and in the case of
... musical... works, to display the copyrighted work publicly. Id. § 106, 1-5.
14. William Krasilovsky & Sidney Shemel, This Business of Music 18, 172-73 (7th
ed. Billboard Books 1995), New York (1995). "The public performance of the written
words and music, which is what happens when a Radio station broadcasts it, is licensed
through BMI, ASCAP and SESAC," according to George Gault, attorney and director of
business affairs for the Associated Press. Ed Ryan & Mark Bingaman, The Death of
Streaming <http://www.radioink. com/HeadlineEntry.asp> (accessed Jan. 1, 2001).
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monitor performance broadcasts and collect royalties, performing
rights organizations such as ASCAP, 15 BMI,16 and SESAC 17 were
formed to protect composers, authors, and publishers. Over the
decades, businesses that broadcast musical works, such as restaurants,
retailers, bars, clubs, hotels, and terrestrial (i.e., traditional) radio
stations, have purchased licenses from these performing rights
organizations, authorizing them to perform those musical works
found in the organizations' catalogues. The performing rights
organizations collect the appropriate fees from these users and then
distribute them in the form of royalties to their members."
Back in the recording studio, a second copyrighted work is also
created during the artistic process. This work is referred to as the
"sound recording," consisting of the actual recording itself.'9 The
sound recording brings the notes and lyrics of the musical work to life
by means of the creative efforts and interpretations of the producer,
engineer, background musicians and, of course, the performer." The
copyright to the sound recording is typically held by the record
company. It is the record company, in fact, that actually signs the
artist to the recording contract and places him or her into the studio.
Traditionally, the record companies have made money by selling
copies of the sound recording, in the form of vinyl albums, and later
15. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, founded in 1914.
ASCAP shares revenues equally between publishers and writers. Fees are collected on the
basis of a general license to radio stations for use of its catalog with the fee of
approximately 2-3.5% of a station's gross receipts less adjustments, with performance
surveys conducted. Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 13, at 192-94; Ryan & Bingaman, supra
n. 15.
16. Broadcast Music, Inc., was founded in 1940 by broadcasters in an effort to
increase the broadcasting industry's bargaining power with ASCAP and to provide an
alternative for writers and publishers not affiliated with ASCAP. Broadcasters are charged
licensing fees based on a formula applied to gross receipts at a rate of approximately 2-
3.5%, with performance surveys conducted. Fees are sent equally to songwriters and
publishers. Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 13, at 192-94; Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
17. The smallest of the performing rights organizations, SESAC was formed in 1930
as a private licensing company. It differs from BMI and ASCAP in that it bases fees on
chart performance rather than on a work's appearance on a performance survey. Also,
songwriter and publisher affiliates share in fifty percent of SESAC's earnings after
expenses. Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 13, at 192-95.
18. See supra nn. 14-16.
19. "Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, regardless of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other
phonorecords, in which they are embodied. 17 U.S.C.S. § 101; see also id. § 102(a)(7).
20. The Recording Industry Association of America, Licensing and Royalties
<http://www.riaa.com/Licensing-Licen-3a.cfm> (accessed Mar. 27, 2002) [hereinafter
Licensing and Royalties].
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cassette tapes and CDs. The record companies then pay the musical
artist a percentage of these sales (i.e., the artist's royalties).2'
While radio broadcasters pay royalties to publishers and writers
for use of the musical work, they have, however, never had to pay any
sort of royalty or licensing fee to the actual record companies for use
of the sound recording. While the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA") opines that this is because the broadcasting
industry has had a stronger lobby on Capitol Hill,22 it has also clearly
been a marriage of convenience: radio broadcasts provide instant
marketing of the sound recording, resulting in consumer purchases of
the record companies' CDs and tapes. Indeed, record companies
habitually flood radio stations with thousands of free copies of new
sound recordings each year, hoping that the products will receive
needed airplay.23
This "favored status" has not been accorded, however, to the
newer, digital technologies such as cable and satellite subscription
music services and providers of streaming audio transmissions over
the Internet (i.e., webcasters). Since the 1995 Digital Performance
Right in Sound Recordings Act ("DPRA"), 24 webcasters offering
subscription music services, for example, had to pay two licensing fees
to both publisher and record company for the copyrighted musical
work as well as the copyrighted sound recording, unlike their
traditional, terrestrial brethren. As a result, a rift began to divide
broadcasters into two camps.25
That said, the situation changed, somewhat, in 1998 under the
DMCA26 when both subscription and non-subscription digital
providers were brought under the Act.27 Imagine the furor created
21. Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 13, at 11-13, 18. In a typical, exclusive artist
recording contract, the performing artist signs on in a work-for-hire capacity, assigning all
copyright ownership in the sound recording to the record company and, if composer
and/or lyricist, copyright ownership of the underlying musical work to a publisher, often
an affiliate of the record company.
22. Licensing and Royalties, supra n. 19.
23. Record companies do not pay any royalties to artists for records that are given
away free for promotional purposes, such as to radio stations, or to distributors.
Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 13.
24. 109 Stat. at 336. The DPRA amends sections 114 and 115 of the Copyright Act
to account for technological changes that were beginning to enable the digital transmission
of sound recordings.
25. See e.g. Doug Wyllie, The DMCA Takes a Swing at Radio <http://www.gavin.
com/features/technology/2001/march/DMCA.php> (March 2001) (commentary by Jon
Potter).
26. 112 Stat. at 2860.
27. Under the DPRA, a compulsory licensing scheme was called for "non-
now when a radio broadcaster, accustomed for decades to paying only
one set of licensing fees to the publisher for a traditional (i.e.,
terrestrial) broadcast, is now told that, if it desires to broadcast the
very same music over the Internet (i.e., a webcast), it must also now
pay the two licensing fees. The radio station demands to know why;
not only will its overhead conceivably double, it is still providing a
valuable and, indeed, expanded marketing service to the record
companies by means of the Internet broadcast.28
To complicate the scenario, assume next that the web-only
stations, most of which have been paying the dual licenses since their
inception, feel no sympathy for their "traditional brethren" who must
now pay the piper for dabbling in Internet broadcasting, as well.29
Assume also the allegation that when the DMCA was being drafted
and the opportunity presented itself for NAB to lobby on behalf of all
broadcasters, whether terrestrial or webcast-only, it chose to
represent only the interests of the terrestrial players, creating this
fracture in the industry.'
Imagine next that the five major record labels," under the
auspices of the RIAA which controls approximately 90% of the
present music sales in the United States,32 decide that they, too, wish
interactive" Internet audio transmissions intended to be similar to the royalty-collections
system already in place for music aired by traditional, terrestrial broadcasters.
Unfortunately, the legislation led to furious debates over the definition of "non-
interactive" and, as a result, exactly what sorts of on-line music services would be covered
under the Act. In 1998, the DMCA attempted to allay this confusion by defining non-
interactive uses. Copyright Office Notice on Mechanical Licenses and Internet Music,
Docket No. RM 2000-7, 66 Fed. Reg. 14099, 14094 (Mar. 9, 2001) (codified at 37 C.F.R. §
255); see also BNA's Patent, Trademark & Copyright Journal, vol. 61, no. 1515 (March 16,
2001).
28. For interesting discussions, consult Christopher Jones, Webcasters in License
Limbo <http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,34115,00. html> (accessed Mar. 27,
2000); Brad King, Webcaster's Defining Moment <http://www.wired.com/news/
culture/0.1284,35767,00.html> (accessed Apr. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Webcasting's Defining
Moment]; Brad King, Webcasters Caught in RIAA Web <http://www.wired.com/
news/print/0,1294,3907 6,00. html> (accessed Sept. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Webcasters
Caught in RIAA Web]; Brad King, Webcaster Goes Intellectual <http://www.wired.com/
news/culture/ 0,1284,39109,00.html> (accessed Oct. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Webcaster Goes
Intellectual].
29. See e.g. Bloomberg News, Radio Stations Sue to Overturn Webcasting Fees
<http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-4619329.html> (accessed Jan. 26, 2001)
[hereinafter Radio Station Sue]; Wyllie, supra n. 24; Steven Bonisteel, RIAA: Internet
Music Licensing Will Fall Industry's Way <http://www.newsbytes.com/news/Ol/
162601.html> (accessed Mar. 1, 2001).
30. Wyllie, supra n. 24; Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
31. As of 2001, these included Universal, Sony, Warner, EMI and BMG.
32. Recording Industry Association of America, Mission Statement <http://
www.riaa.com/About-Who.cfm> (accessed July 31, 2001).
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to become involved with webcasting game.33 Realizing, though, that
they would also have to pay the musical-work licensing fee to
publishers and songwriters for web broadcasting, they begin to
scheme in an effort to pay as little as possible. Publishers and
songwriters instantly lash back.34
Finally, compound the problem by the fact that the current
copyright law does not set any licensing rates whatsoever for
webcasts, nor provide much in the way of definition for the various
types of webcasting options available. Members of Congress admit
that they don't know what to do.35 The Copyright Office, under siege,
asks repeatedly for public comments on the matter. 6 Lawsuits begin
to fire back and forth. 7 Under intense pressure from record
companies, AFTRA,38 publishers, songwriters, and artists, smaller
webcasters begin closing their doors.39 Even mega-terrestrial stations,
experimenting with webcasts, start shutting down until a resolution is
reached."'
It sounds a bit like an episode from "The Twilight Zone Law."
Unfortunately, this particular episode is true and has been going on
since the mid 1990s. To understand the situation better, this article
33. Norton, supra n. 2.
34. Brian Krebs, Songwriters, Publishers Fight Web-Royalty Moratorium
<http://www.infowar.com/law/01/law_052501-j.shtml> (accessed May 25, 2001); King,
supra n. 6.
35. "Help the committees," Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) reportedly said after the
Napster decision, "because we don't know what to do." Snyder, supra n. 4.
36. See Joint Study Required by Section 104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, U.S. Copyright Office (available at <http://www.loc.gov/copyrights/reports/
studies/dmca/dmcastudy.html>); U.S. Copyright Office, Statement of the Register of
Copyrights Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property Committee on
Judiciary, United States House of Representatives May 25, 2000) (available at
<http://www.loc.gov/copyright/ docs/regstat52500-2.html>); Rulemakings and Related
Actions Concerning Webcasting, 65 Fed. Reg. 77292, 77292-77293 (Dec. 11, 2000); 65 Fed.
Reg. 77330, 77331 (Dec. 11, 2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 78434, 78434 (Dec. 15 2000); Copyright
Office Notice on Mechanical Licenses and Internet Music 66 Fed. Reg. 14099, 14099 (Mar.
9, 2001) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 255).
37. See Brad King, More Suits Over Streaming Music <http://www.wired.
com/news/mp3/0,1285,44416,00.html> (accessed June 9, 2001).
38. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists.
39. See e.g. Reuters, Thomas Baxter Resigns as Audible CEO Downsizes
<http://www.radiohorizon.com/index.php3?fcn=displayarticle&id=1972> (accessed July
24, 2001); Radio Horizon, WebRadio to Shut Down <http://www.radiohorizon.
com/index.php3?fcn=displayarticle&id=1980> (accessed July 25, 2001) [hereinafter
WebRadio to Shut Down].
40. See e.g. Joanna Glasner, Webcasters Propose Royalty Plan <http://www.wired.
com/news/business/0,1367,42994,00.html> (accessed Apr. 11, 2001) (on the temporary
shutdown of the Clear Channel Internet Group).
will next address the genesis of the conflict: relevant portions of the
1995 and 1998 revisions to the Copyright Act.
II
Chapter Two: A Brief History, Beginning with The Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995.
Prior to 1995, recording artists in the United States, and the
record companies that owned their work under contract (typically in a
work-for-hire arrangement), could not collect royalties for broadcast
performances of sound recording.4 Essentially, the record companies
could charge consumers for albums, tapes, and CDs, but once in the
hands of the public, no purchaser ever expected to have to pay any
additional money every time the album, tape, or CD was played
privately. Radio stations expected likewise for their public, analog
broadcasts. Indeed, the history of popular music is replete with stories
of bribes and payola given to disc jockeys, station managers, music
directors and owners by the record companies as they competed
fiercely for airplay of their latest releases." After all, airplay meant
record sales, and no one in the record industry fought very hard to
make radio stations pay licensing fees to do so."
Thus, a peculiar anomaly existed under the Copyright Act:
copyright holders had a right to grant licenses and collect fees for
public performances in the underlying musical work but not in the
sound recording.44 This anomaly was compounded by the fact that,
typically, two different entities usually hold these copyrights:
publishers own the musical work copyright and record companies the
sound recording copyright.45 The actual artist usually retains very few
intellectual property rights in the work; in a standard recording or
publishing contract, the artist serves in a work-for-hire capacity and
gives away most existing intellectual property rights to the publisher
and/or label in exchange for their efforts of manufacturing, promoting
and distributing the work. In exchange, the artist receives a
41. Licensing and Royalties, supra n. 19.
42. Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 13, at 120-25 (discussion of payola).
43. However, the RIAA takes the position that radio broadcasters maintained a
stronger lobby on Capitol Hill, resulting in the recording industry's inability to receive
royalties on sound recording usage. Licensing and Royalties, supra n. 19. Antitrust consent
decrees governing licenses from ASCAP and BMI go back decades. Barry Skidelskys,
Music Streaming Webcasts <http://www.slreamingmediasig.com/resources.htm> (accessed
May 26, 2002).
44. Licensing and Royalties, supra n. 19.
45. Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 13, at 18, 172.
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percentage of sales, either negotiated or statutory, called royalties. 46
This situation, as it has existed in the United States, is quite
different from other parts of the world where copyright holders have
enjoyed both rights simultaneously. For example, European radio
stations have been obliged by law, for years, to keep meticulous logs
and submit detailed airplay reports to artistic collection societies for
payment to both right holders." Bennett Lincoff, senior counsel for
Darby & Darby and former ASCAP legal director, explains the
political reasons for the difference in the United States:
The U.S. is one of the few countries that does not allow
sound recording copyright owners to license performances
of their works in analog media. The record labels have lob-
bied for years to force Radio stations to pay for over-the-air
broadcasts of sound performances, and the NAB opposed
that by saying the Radio industry was already developed
economically, already paying royalties, and it would be un-
fair to impose this new burden. ASCAP and BMI also op-
posed the effort because they were afraid the NAB would
carry the day on the Hill and argue that broadcasters
shouldn't pay anymore, but rather, the money should come
out of what ASCAP and BMI already were getting from the
industry.48
By the mid 1990s, this discontinuity between the United States
and its treaty partners belonging to the European Economic
Community required resolution in the form of harmonization and a
revision of the Copyright Act. In addition, a new form of
technological transmission-commercial music subscriptions by cable
and satellite providers, such as DMX and Music Choice, was making
headway.49 The technology needed for streaming audio and visual
media over the Internet, although not yet present in the marketplace,
was only months away."
Thus, in 1995, the Copyright Act was amended by means of the
46. Id. at 11-13, 18.
47. International Webcasting Organization, Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
More Music Licensing Royalties for Webcasters <http://www.webcasters.org/legal/
index.html> [hereinafter More Music Licensing Royalties]; see also Licensing and
Royalties, supra n. 19.
48. Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
49. Licensing and Royalties, supra n. 19.
50. Jim Bartimo, They May Not Be Technology's A-List, But... They've Changed
Your Life, 20 PC Magazine, no. 15, 160-61 (Sept. 4, 2001) (discussion of Progressive
Networks' technology for streaming on-line music, introduced in 1995).
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DPRA ("1995 Act")." The DPRA was something of a compromise.
Careful not to upset the decades-long balance between the powerful
recording and radio broadcasting industries, Congress took a small
step. The Act targeted only the new subscription music services
offered primarily by digital "newcomers": cable, satellite and, soon,
Internet providers. Copyright owners would receive a performance
right for those "digital audio transmissions" offered on a subscription
basis; however, live performances, audio-visual transmissions such as
movies, and traditional terrestrial radio and television broadcasts
were excluded.52
This meant, essentially, that the only entities clearly envisioned,
at the time of the 1995 Act, as being liable to pay fees to the recording
companies for use of the sound recordings were the new entities
offering digital subscription music services." At the time, the idea
seemed a good one. As far as the major players were concerned, the
status quo could essentially be maintained between the labels and
radio stations; in addition, the United States had made some effort to
harmonize with the EEC. According to Ed Ryan and Mark Bigaman,
editors of Radio Ink:
The perfect idea that materialized in Washington was to
keep the powerful record company lobby happy by finally
allowing them their desire to profit from the licensing of
their sound recording copyrights. That would be accom-
plished by tacking fees onto the streaming of sound record-
ings. Traditional broadcasters would be soothed by the
knowledge that their over-the-air fees wouldn't increase,
and groups like ASCAP and BMI wouldn't have to share
any pieces of their pie. Those bearing the brunt of the cost
would be the new Internet companies, who had not yet
taken the time to build relationships in Congress and
yielded very little political power. It seemed to be a perfect
solution until terrestrial broadcasters began to get more ag-
gressive with their streaming efforts. 4
Indeed, the Radio industry, at first, had not even envisioned
itself as being a part of the "new media" in 1995. Former ASCAP
counsel, Bennett Lincoff, commented,
51. 109 Stat. at 336. For a brief legislative history, see Copyright Office Notice on
Mechanical Licenses and Internet Music, 66 Fed. Reg. 14099, 14099 (Mar. 9, 2001)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. § 255).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
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When I was at ASCAP in 1995, I talked with top people in
the legal departments of CBS and ABC, trying to gbt them
to take licenses for their affiliates. They were not going to
do it because they were distancing themselves from any use
of music on their websites.55
He surmises that "[t]hey did not appreciate the opportunity. ', 56
In April 1995, however, the floodgates were opened. Multimedia
software developer, Progressive Networks, released RealAudio, the
first technology for streaming audio. From there, RealNetworks
created the RealPlayer software, handling both audio and visual
streaming. 7 The technology was now in place to produce digital audio
transmissions over the Internet-and webcasting arrived. The playing
field was initially wide open; anyone with an updated PC and a few
pieces of relatively inexpensive equipment could now operate a
cyber-radio station from home-or freely download and share
music. 8 No laws on point existed to regulate the practice.
The new technology, along with its various Internet applications,
spread quickly. Suddenly, online-only webcasters were streaming
digital music over the Internet-not merely on the envisioned
subscription basis like satellite and cable companies, but also on a
non-subscription basis by means of paid advertisements, like ordinary
radio programming. 9  Not surprisingly, digital broadcasters
successfully argued that they were not liable for royalties because
non-subscription transmissions were not covered under the 1995
Act.60
Feeling the rug pulled out from under it, the recording industry
began to lobby for another revision to the Copyright Act-this time
to account for both subscription and non-subscription digital audio
transmissions. In what was becoming an increasing source of
contention surrounding the right of streaming digital audio content,
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Bartimo, supra n. 49, at 160-61.
58. In 2001, the RealPlayer software had been downloaded by 200 million people
and licensing agreements signed with thousands of Web sites. RealNetworks CEO, Robert
Glaser, states that, "RealPlayer is the second most frequently-found application on a PC,
after Windows." Bartimo, supra, n. 49, at 160-61.
59. See e.g. The Digital Media Association, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998-A Primer for DiMA Members at 1-2 <http://www.digmedia.org/dmca/DMCA
exp.html> (last updated Dec. 1, 1998) (for a history of events preceding the DMCA).
60. Id.
the RIAA sought compensation for its copyright holders from
webcasters, in particular, those who were already streaming major-
label music on a non-subscription basis.
III
Chapter Three: An Eleventh-Hour Deal
It was apparent that the DPRA had proved insufficient and that
the Copyright Act was now in need of amendment on another front,
specifically, for harmonization with World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") treaties regarding Internet piracy and
security." When Congress was nearing completion of this revision,
called the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,62 the recording industry
intensified its lobbying efforts for an insertion of additional language
relevant to the digital audio transmission question. The recording
industry became threatening now, promising litigation if smaller
music-industry parties did not cooperate63 and even pressuring
Congress that if its webcasting language could not be inserted into the
revision, it would no longer be able to release its content.'
In an effort to appease the RIAA, Congress permitted a last-
minute hearing on the matter. The main players were hastily
assembled in 1998. They included: the RIAA, representing the major
labels; the NAB; the National Music Publishers Association, Inc.
("NMPA"); the Songwriter's Guild of America ("SGA"), and the
Digital Media Association ("DiMA")-all of whom would soon be
pitted against each other once the new Act was passed.
RIAA President and Chief Executive Officer, Hillary Rosen,
argued that the changes were instituted in order to facilitate
webcasting.6 ' Not all parties felt that way, however. Seth Greenstein,
attorney for DiMA, a trade organization representing digital media
61. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (available at <http://www.mgm.
musin.ed>); Digital Millennium Copyright Act (WIPO Implementing Legislation),
National Music Publishers' Association, Inc. at 1, 4-5 (available at <http://
www.nmpa.org>) [hereinafter WIPO Implementation Legislation].
62. 112 Stat. at 2860; see also The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2001).
63. Gloria Hylton, The Following Letter Requests that You Repeal the DMCA,
NWEZ <http://www.femmefatale.nu/dmca/letter.htm> (accessed April 26. 2002) (from a
telephone conversation with Seth Greenstein, attorney for DiMA).
64. Snyder, supra n. 4; Webcaster Goes Intellectual, supra n. 24.
65. "This is an important right for artists and record companies. We look forward to
working with the broadcasters for a smooth transition into this marketplace." Wyllie,
supra n. 24.
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broadcasters,66 explained that it had only a few days to prepare before
the hastily-convened hearing. Worse, DiMA could not afford the
RIAA's threatened litigation in the event the DMCA amendments
failed to pass. Worried that potential webcast investors would be
frightened off by a legal fight with the RIAA, DiMA conceded more
than it should have. 7
With few options at the moment, DiMA sought to simplify,
rather than contest, the licensing payment process. It negotiated for a
compulsory license under the statute, which would allow webcasters
to pay the licensing fees to a single clearinghouse-the RIAA.
Receiving this compulsory license was critical for webcasters; the
alternative would require a webcaster to seek out all of the copyright
holders of each piece of music played in order to make individualized
royalty payments.68 At the time, NAB's loyalties laid primarily with
analog, terrestrial radio broadcasters. NAB did nothing to help
DiMA-as far as NAB was concerned, the licensing provision did not
apply to ordinary radio broadcasters-even those who might wish, on
occasion, to provide an Internet simulcast.
Also backed against a wall, NMPA and its allies fought to keep
what they had. They managed to negotiate for and obtain language
specifying that these new, clarified rights of the recording companies
would in no way impair the rights of publishers and songwriters
holding copyrights to the underlying musical works. In particular,
nothing in the DMCA amendments "annuls, limits, impairs, or
otherwise affects in any way the existence of value of any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owners" of musical works, including
the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute a digital work (by
digital phonorecord or otherwise) under sections 106(1), 106(3), and
115 of the Copyright Act.69
66. The so-called "Net-only casters." Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13; Hylton, supra
n. 62.
67. Hylton, supra n. 62.
68. The notion of a compulsory license, preventing the unauthorized copying of
sound recordings, was codified under the 1976 Copyright Act, based on prior federal court
interpretations involving record piracy cases. These federal cases were brought primarily
by the Harry Fox Agency, the mechanical licensing firm acting on behalf of most
publishers in the United States. The Register of Copyrights has observed that a
compulsory license is particularly severe on the copyright holder: "Once he exploits his
right to record his music, he is deprived of control over further recordings. He cannot
control their quality nor can he select the persons who will make them. There have been
many complaints of inferior recordings and of recordings by financially irresponsible
persons." Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 13, at 118-19, 151-52.
69. WIPO Implementation Legislation, supra n. 60.
At the eleventh hour, without House or Senate debate,0 the
music industry persuaded Congress to include this additional
language into the DMCA. At the time, it seemed conclusive; it
addressed the issues regarding digital audio transmission licensing,
taking into account the new webcasting technology, including both
subscription and non-subscription services, and defining rules for a
compulsory license.7 It would not prove, however, to be a solution.
IV
Chapter Four: The History Continues: The Digital Millenium
Copyright Act of 1998
On October 28, 1998, the DMCA was signed." Congress' primary
goal in drafting this revision of the Copyright Act was to allow the
United States to participate in two new WIPO treaties: the Copyright
Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty, which updated
international copyright standards on Internet technology security and
anti-piracy measures. 3 Congress' secondary goal of pleasing the
recording industry by permitting last-minute language on webcasting
would soon become a thorn in its side.
The RIAA believed that the language was clear on its face: (1)
webcasters who provided a non-interactive service (i.e., one in which
listeners had no ability to alter or select the musical programming)
and (2) followed strict guidelines regarding programming and
transmission, would be entitled to seek a compulsory license under
the statute. This license would ease the burden of having to locate
and pay all of the individual record companies that held the sound
recording copyrights to the various musical selections transmitted: the
RIAA agreed to serve as the single clearinghouse for all of its
member major labels.74 If a webcaster did not meet the requirements,
then it would be obligated to locate and pay all of the copyright
holders, on its own.
Under the DMCA, the specific requirements were as follows:
70. Hylton, supra n. 62, at 2.
71. See e.g. Wyllie, supra n. 24.
72. 112 Stat. at 2860.
73. Major amendments include: (1) an anti-circumvention provision designed to
outlaw the trafficking in cyber-era "burglar tools," such as blackbox devices that thwart
anti-piracy encryption and scrambling; (2) protection of copyright management
information (CMI); and a clarification of service provider liability for online piracy. The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra n. 60; WIPO Implementation Legislation, supra n.
60.
74. Jones, supra n. 27.
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First, only webcasters who offered non-interactive (i.e., not on-
demand or personalized) programming would be allowed the
statutory license.7" Second, the webcaster had to be in the business of
offering primarily audio or other entertainment programming as
opposed to selling particular products or services.7 6 For the most part,
these requirements were an easy fit for the traditional, terrestrial
radio station interested in webcasting (i.e., those whose interests
NAB supported). On the other hand, on-line music providers that
allowed users to select and download music of their choice were
intentionally left out of the licensing loop, as well as some then-
existing, and certainly future, innovative and entrepreneurial
providers of streaming audio technology.
The RIAA also demanded, and received, a laundry list of
program and transmission conditions that webcasters would have to
meet in order to receive the compulsory license. First, they would
agree to pay royalties.77 The problem, however, was that the DMCA
did not stipulate an amount. The Act provided only that, if the parties
could not contractually agree on a rate, then a Copyright Arbitration
Royalty Panel (CARP) would be convened to set it.78 Upon the
CARP decision, royalties would then be payable at the determined
rate, retroactive to October 1998.79 At the time, no one seemed overly
disturbed by this, largely because the coming explosion of webcasting
had not been anticipated.
Second, webcasters had to agree to adhere to a "sound recording
performance complement." 8 In essence, the webcaster would not be
allowed to play, in any three-hour-period, (1) more than three songs
from a particular album, including no more than two consecutively, or
(2) four songs by a particular artist or a boxed set, including no more
than three consecutively." Third, prior announcements would not be
permitted. Advance song or artist playlists could not be published,
and "teaser" announcements using artists' names could not specify
75. "The performance of a sound recording publicly by means of a subscription
digital audio transmission not exempt under paragraph (1), an eligible nonsubscription
transmission, or a transmission not exempt under paragraph (1) that is made a preexisting
satellite digital audio radio service shall be subject to statutory licensing, in accordance
with subsection (f) if-(A)(i) the transmission is not part of an interactive service." 112
Stat. at 2890-91.
76. See e.g. id. at 2893.
77. Id. at 2896.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2891.
81. Id.
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the time a song would be played. 2 Fourth, archived programming
could not be less than five hours nor reside on a web site for longer
than two weeks;83 looped or continuous programs could not be less
than three hours in duration.' Scheduled programs less than one hour
in duration could only be performed three times in a two-week
period." In addition, webcasters also had to agree to identify the
sound recording, album and featured artist (this requirement took
effect one year later on October 28, 1999),6 and could not suggest a
connection in any way between the copyright owner or recording
artist and a particular product or service.87
Finally, webcasters had to agree to take proactive steps to protect
the copyright holder's rights in the sound recording.' For instance, if
82. "In the case of an eligible nonsubscription transmission or a subscription
transmission not exempt under paragraph (1) that is made by a new subscription service or
by a preexisting subscription service other than in the same transmission medium used by
such service on July 31, 1988-(ii) the transmitting entity does not cause to be published,
or induce or facilitate the publication, by means of an advance program schedule or prior
announcement, the titles of the specific sound recordings to be transmitted, the
phonorecords embodying such sound recordings, or, other than for illustrative purposes,
the names of the featured artists." Id. at 2891-92.
83. "(iii) the transmission-(I) is not part of an archived program of less than 5
hours duration; (II) is not part of an archived program of 5 hours or greater in duration
that is made available for a period not exceeding 2 weeks;" Id. at 2892.
84. "(III) [the transmission] is not part of a continuous program which is of less than
3 hours duration;" Id.
85. "(IV) [the transmission] is not part of an identifiable program in which
performances of sound recordings are rendered in a predetermined order, other than an
archived or continuous program, that is transmitted at-(aa) more than 3 times in any 2-
week period that have been publicly announced in advance, in the case of a program of
less than 1 hour in duration, or (bb) more than 4 times in any 2-week period that have
been publicly announced in advance, in the case of a program of less than 1 hour in
duration," Id.
86. "(ix) the transmitting entity identifies in textual data the sound recording during,
but not before, the time it is performed, including the title of the sound recording, the title
of the phonorecord embodying such sound recording, if any, and the featured recording
artist, in a manner to permit it to be displayed to the transmission recipient by the device
or technology intended for receiving the service provided by the transmitting entity." Id.
at 2894.
87. "(iv) the transmitting entity does not knowingly perform the sound recording, as
part of a service that offers transmissions of visual images contemporaneously with
transmissions of sound recordings, in a manner that is likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, or to deceive, as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the copyright
owner or featured recording artist with the transmitting entity or a particular product or
service advertised by the transmitting entity, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
by the copyright owner or featured recording artist of the activities of the transmitting
entity other than the performance of the sound recording itself;" Id. at 2893.
88. "(viii) the transmitting entity accommodates and does not interfere with the
transmission of technical measures that are widely used by sound recording copyright
owners to identify or protect copyrighted works, and that are technically feasible of being
2001]
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a webcaster became aware that a listener/recipient was copying music
and the webcaster possessed the technology to disable the copying, it
would be obliged to do so,89 as well as to take care not to induce or
encourage copying efforts by any transmission recipients.90
Webcasters would also be required, if no substantial burden were
imposed, to accommodate technical protection measures of
copyrighted works,9' and to cooperate with copyright owners to
prevent recipients from using scanning devices on transmissions to
detect particular artists or recordings.' Webcasters would not be
allowed to cause a device receiving the transmission to switch from
one program channel to another,93 and transmissions needed to be
accompanied by the information encoded in the sound recording by
the copyright owner identifying the song title, featured artist and any
other related information.94
If that was not enough, another question was raised: what about
the copies of sound recordings that had to be made on the webcaster's
server in order to transmit the sound recordings? Was a separate fee
required for those so-called "ephemeral recordings," as well?95 The
transmitted by the transmitting entity without imposing substantial costs on the
transmitting entity." Id. at 2893-94.
89. "(vi) the transmitting entity takes no affirmative steps to cause or induce the
making of a phonorecord by the transmission recipient, and if the technology used by the
transmitting entity enables the transmitting entity to limit the making of the transmission
recipient of phonorecords of the transmission directly in a digital format, the transmitting
entity sets such technology to limit such making of phonorecords to the extent permitted
by such technology;" Id. at 2893.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2893-94.
92. "(v) the transmitting entity cooperates to prevent, to the extent feasible without
imposing substantial costs or burdens, a transmission recipient or any other person or
entity from automatically scanning the transmitting entity's transmissions alone or
together with transmissions by other transmitting entities in order to select a particular
sound recording to be transmitted to the transmission recipient." Id. at 2893.
93. "(ii) except in the case of a transmission to a business establishment, the
transmitting entity does not automatically and intentionally cause any device receiving the
transmission to switch from one program channel to another;" Id. at 2891.
94. "(iii) ... the transmission of the sound recording is accompanied, if technically
feasible, by the information encoded in that sound recording, if any, by or under the
authority of the copyright owner of that sound recording, that identifies the title of the
sound recording, the featured recording artist who performs on the sound recoding, and
related information, including information concerning the underlying musical work and its
writer;" Id.
95. "(b) EPHEMERAL RECORDINGS-Section 112 of title 17, United States
Code, is amended-(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and (2) by
inserting after subsection (d) the following: (e) STATUTORY LICENSE.-(1) A
transmitting organization entitled to transmit to the public a performance of a sound
recording under the limitation on exclusive rights specified by section 114(d)(1)(C)(iv) or
Act provided an exemption for one ephemeral recording if (1) the
webcaster making the ephemeral recording held the statutory license
to transmit the recording (i.e., qualified under the above)" and (2)
met the exemption conditions, including exclusive use of the
ephemeral recording by the webcaster and destruction of the copy
(unless retained for archival purposes) within six months.7
That said, the battle was ready to begin.
V
Chapter Five: The Games Begin:
November 1998-December 2000
After the DMCA was passed on October 28th, the first order of
business called for the RIAA and broadcasters to negotiate an
appropriate licensing fee. In the event they could not reach an
agreement, the Act provided that a CARP would be convened to do
so. 98 It took less than two weeks for the first shot to be fired. NAB,
arguing on behalf of terrestrial radio broadcasters, argued that
Internet simulcasts of a radio station's signal were not covered under
the Act and, thus, subject neither to royalty payments nor compliance
with transmission and programming rules under the compulsory
under a statutory license, under the conditions specified by this subsection, to make no
more than 1 phonorecord of the sound recording... if the following terms and conditions
are satisfied: (A) The phonorecord is retained and used solely by the transmitting
organization that made it, and no further phonorecords are reproduced from it. (B) The
phonorecord is used solely for the transmitting organization's own transmissions
originating in the United States under a statutory license ... (C) Unless preserved
exclusively for purposes of archival preservation, the phonorecord is destroyed within 6
months from the date the sound recording was first transmitted to the public using the
phonorecord." Id. at 2899.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Relevant language in the DMCA stated:
In the absence of license agreements negotiated under subparagraph
(A), during the 60-day period commencing 6 months after publication
of the notice ... and upon the filing of a petition ... the Librarian of
Congress shall ... convene a copyright arbitration royalty panel to
determine and publish in the Federal Register, a schedule of rates and
terms which ... shall be binding on all copyright owners of sound
recordings and entities performing sound recordings .... In
establishing rates and terms ... the copyright arbitration royalty panel
may consider the rates and terms for comparable types of subscription
digital audio transmission services and comparable circumstances
under voluntary license agreements negotiated.
Id. at 2894-95.
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license requirements. The RIAA argued that they were. Negotiations
broke down almost immediately, and on November 8th, NAB filed
for Copyright Office intervention."
Essentially, the parties could not agree on definitions within the
statutory language as to who or what services were subject to the
royalty provisions and transmission restrictions, much less on the
actual licensing fees. For the better part of 1999, the issue centered on
whether terrestrial radio broadcasters, who wished to retransmit their
own signals over the Internet (i.e., a web simulcast), were providing a
"service"1" subject to the statutory licensing provisions governing
public performances of sound recordings by means of digital audio
transmissions, under the DMCA. 10'
The RIAA insisted that they were and, thus, should pay the
applicable royalty provisions and obey programming restrictions, just
like any other webcaster. °2 Commentary some months later by Frank
Davis, Media Director of EMI's Astralwerks label, summed up the
RIAA's position: "The major labels don't want to be able to tune into
a webcast and hear the latest.., recording being played in its entirety
every hour on the hour."1 °3 NAB continued to argue that they were
not subject to the royalty fees.' 04
Finally, the RIAA filed a petition with the Copyright Office
asking them to make a determination, along with any necessary
statutory modifications (i.e., a rulemaking), on the issue.1"5
99. As a result of the NAB filing, proceedings involving the copyright arbitration
panel were placed on hold. Wyllie, supra n. 24.
100. See e.g. DMCA Takes a Swing at Radio, supra n. 24; Jones, supra n. 27.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Webcasting's Defining Moment, supra n. 27.
104. Id.; see infra nn. 105-06.
105. On November 27, 1998, the Copyright Office published, in the Federal Register,
notice of initiation of voluntary proceedings under the new statutory license of ephemeral
records, under section 405(b), 17 U.S.C. § 112(e). U.S. Copyright Office, Register's
Statement, May 25, 2000 (Statement of the Register of Copyrights before the Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property Committee on Judiciary, United States House of
Representatives, May 25, 2000) (available at <http://www.1oc.gov/copyright/docs/
regstat52500-2.html>). On September 20, 1999, the Copyright Office revised section
504(a), codified at 37 C.F.R § 260, with respect to notice and record keeping, along with
initiation of CARP proceedings regarding the use of sound recordings in digital
transmissions under the compulsory license. Id. Interim regulations were published June
24, 1998, and amended on September 20, 1999. Id. In November 1999, the Copyright
Office filed its Notices of Intent to Participate regarding the issuance of new regulations
on the statutory license for ephemeral records found in section 405(b) (17 U.SC. § 112(e)).
Id. The proceeding stayed pending resolution of the rulemaking proceedings regarding the
definition of "service" for purposes of a statutory license governing the public
performance of a sound recording by means of a digital audio transmission. Id.
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On March 16, 2000, the Copyright Office responded to the
RIAA petition, agreeing to initiate a rulemaking. ° In less than two
weeks, NAB attempted to circumvent the outcome: on March 27th, it
filed suit in a United States District Court in New York 7 to have the
same issue adjudicated by the court rather than the Copyright Office.
NAB also requested that the Copyright Office suspend its rulemaking
proceedings until the court issued a final decision." "Jeff Baumann,
NAB's executive vice president of legal and regulatory affairs, stated:
"We believe that the applicable statute, which is the 1995 Copyright
Act and the later DMCA, provides that we are exempt from paying a
performance fee .... That's why we argued that way in front of the
Copyright Office, and that's why we filed suit in New York."'"
The Copyright Office, in the meantime, refused NAB's request;
it would take up the matter."O Concurrently, the RIAA filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint in the court case, which was subsequently
denied."' The RIAA took the position that the difference was one of
analog versus digital. Steve Marks, RIAA's senior vice president of
business and legal affairs, replied:
We disagree with the NAB's arguments and the copyright
office agreed with us. The 1995 law and the DMCA
amendments grandfathered over-the-air Radio broadcasts
but made clear that other digital transmissions of sound re-
cordings are subject to the performance rights of the sound
recording copyright owners. In the context of Webcasting,
the fact that the programmer has an FCC license for over-
the-air broadcasting should not give their Webcasts special
status .
In the meantime, another argument was brewing, this one
regarding the definition of "consumer-influenced" (i.e., interactive)
106. On March 16, 2000, the Copyright Office responded to an RIAA petition and
initiated a rulemaking to determine whether radio stations that transmit their own signals
over the Internet (i.e., simulcasts) are "services" subject to the royalty provisions and
programming restrictions of the DMCA. Id.
107. The Digital Media Association (DiMA), Broadcasters Seek Exemption from
Webcasting License-Update <http://www.digmedia.org/whatsnew/broadcasters.html>
(May 2000) [hereinafter Broadcasters Seek Exemption].
108. Id.; supra n. 106.
109. Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
110. Broadcasters Seek Exemption, supra n. 106.
111. The case was later argued on May 29, 2001. See e.g. Ryan & Bingaman, supra n.
13; Broadcasters Seek Exemption, supra n. 106.
112. Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
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webcasts. The fracture within the broadcasting industry between
terrestrial and on-line broadcasters was now coming home to roost.
When NAB negotiated the original DMCA language with the RIAA,
it ignored the then-fledgling DiMA and its Internet-only webcasters;
rather, it envisioned, along with most other parties at the table,
webcasts with a traditional, radio-station format: either a direct
simulcast or pre-programmed format without a listener's ability to
modify or select the music received online. As a result, the DMCA
provided that only such non-interactive webcasts could qualify for the
compulsory license and its benefit of the single, RIAA clearinghouse;
any other webcast offering a consumer-influenced service would not
be eligible."3 Now that more terrestrial stations were becoming
interested in operating a side channel on the Internet, however, the
tables were beginning to turn for NAB.
On April 17, 2000, another Petition for Rulemaking was filed
with the Copyright Office: this time by the DiMA." ' DiMA asked the
Copyright Office to adopt a rule interpreting the definition of
"interactive service" in Section 14(j)(7) of the Copyright Act"5 so as
to exclude it from the definition "consumer-influenced" webcasting
services, and to determine whether interactive web services should be
subject to the licensing requirements and fees."6 DiMA also
requested clarification on "consumer-influenced" websites that
catered to specific tastes, such as genre-based formats (Top 40, hip-
hop, country, etc.) and whether those had also created an interactive
radio service under the DMCA."7 Three options existed for
clarification of this issue: the Copyright Office could adopt a rule;
Congress could amend the DMCA to address the interactivity
question; or the matter could be pursued in federal court.
On May 23, 2000, the Copyright Office sought comments in
response to DiMA's April 17th Petition.' Seven comments followed,
113. See Larry Powers, Is It the Digital Millennium Copyright Act or the Detached
Masonry Control Act (collectively known as the DMCA)? <http://www.newmediamusic.
comi8l/newmediamusic.com/dynamic/articles/NM01060193.html> (accessed June 18,
2001); Reuters, Launch Media, Webcasters Sue Recording Industry, 1, 1 <http://
www.radiohorizon.con/index.php3?fcn=displyarticle&id=1745> (June 4, 2001).
114. Broadcasters Seek Exemption, supra n. 106; Webcasting's Defining Moment,
supra n. 102.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7) (2001).
116. In re: Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of "Interactive
Service"; Docket No. 2000-4 (Petition Submitted on April 17, 2000, by the Digital Media
Association (DiMA), before the Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.).
117. Id.; Webcasting's Defining Moment, supra n. 102.
118. 65 Fed. Reg. 33266, 33266 (May 23, 2000).
filed by broadcasting organizations, the RIAA, and the National
Music Publishers' Association ("NMPA")."9 Publishers, along with
the RIAA, were afraid of losing ground. Publishers argued against
what they called a "music giveaway," where if consumers were
allowed to customize their online broadcasts, then they would have
little or no incentive to purchase the music. The RIAA, in the
meantime, argued that DiMA was raising a hypothetical and vague
issue that couldn't possibly be answered. 2' Since DiMA would not
provide detailed information about the specific online services it had
in mind for the exemption, it was essentially asking for a general rule
in which future permutations would be impossible to predict.2 The
RIAA also argued that DiMA was attempting to nullify Congress'
intent to keep the interactive condition separate from compliance
with the other conditions needed for receipt of the compulsory
license." According to the RIAA and the NMPA, online-service
providers of customizable listening options should not be allowed the
benefit of the one-stop, "clearinghouse convenience" of the
compulsory license. With the Napster124 case raging at the time, the
publishing and recording industries were not about to lose any more
profit to online music providers if they could help it.
Predictions indicated that the Copyright Office would agree with
this position; as a result, webcasters began approaching the RIAA in
attempts to negotiate private licensing deals.1 2' The Copyright Office
had yet to convene the arbitration panel to determine compulsory
licensing rates retroactive to October 1998. This meant that webcast
service providers of all types, whether simulcast, subscription, non-
subscription, interactive or pre-programmed, still had two choices
available to them: they could either negotiate independently with the
RIAA for their own, agreed-upon licensing rate and broadcasting
terms or, file their intent to comply with the stipulations under the
119. Broadcasters Seek Exemption, supra n. 106.
120. Id.; Webcasting's Defining Moment, supra n. 102.
121. In re: Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of "Interactive
Service," Docket No. RM 2000-4 (Comments of the Recording Industry Association of
America, Inc. (June 22, 2000 and July 14, 2000)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004.
125. Webcasters Caught in RIAA Web, supra n. 27; Webcaster Goes Intellectual, supra
n. 27; Brad King, Rule Reversal: Blame It on RIAA <http://www.wired.com/news/
politics/0,1283,38129,00.html> (accessed Aug. 10, 2000); Mark Lewis, RIAA to Enter $400
Million Music Licensing Business <http://trowbridgeplanetearth.comf/2/news/RIA
brief.html> (accessed May 8, 2000).
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statutory compulsory license, wait for the Copyright Office's
determination of rates, and then pay up.26
If webcast service providers negotiated privately with the RIAA,
then it might be possible under contract to offer any sort of
programming format or service desired while using the RIAA as a
licensing-fee clearinghouse for its member-label copyright holders.
On the other hand, a private negotiation, without the benefit of a
market standard or Copyright Office determination, prevented a
webcaster from knowing if its deal with the RIAA, regarding
applicable fees and terms relative to the competition, was a good one
or not. The RIAA kept the terms of its licensing agreements secret.1
7
This was too great a risk for many webcast entrepreneurs,
including even Mark Cuban, who had previously built broadcast.com
into a multi-million dollar operation. Cuban promptly sold
broadcast.com and quipped, "What's the best business in the
webcasting industry? Prepackaged bankruptcies to avoid RIAA
fees!"12
8
Regarding these individual deals, allegations also began to fly
throughout the fall of 2000 against the RIAA: webcasters argued that
the RIAA prohibited them from revealing the royalty fees they
negotiated and that the terms of private deals might be used to
influence the fees set by the Copyright Office later; that the RIAA
refused to deal with small webcasters or that it was not treating
everyone equally; and that certain.webcasters were jockeying to curry
126. Relevant language in the DMCA stated:
In the absence of license agreements negotiated under subparagraph
(A), during the 60-day period commencing 6 months after publication
of the notice ... and upon the filing of a petition ... the Librarian of
Congress shall ... convene a copyright arbitration royalty panel to
determine and publish in the Federal Register, a schedule of rates and
terms which ... shall be binding on all copyright owners of sound
recordings and entities performing sound recordings.... In
establishing rates and terms ... the copyright arbitration royalty panel
may consider the rates and terms for comparable types of subscription
digital audio transmission services and comparable circumstances
under voluntary license agreements negotiated.
112 Stat. at 2894-95.
127. See Webcasters Caught in RIAA Web, supra n. 27; Webcaster Goes Intellectual,
supra n. 27.
128. Mark Cuban, Maverick's Mark Cuban Warns RAIN Readers of RIAA Liability
<http://kurthanson.com/HTM-RAIN/NewsArchives/1000/100600.htm> (accessed Oct. 6,
2000).
unfair favor with the RIAA.'29
Even Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) was becoming suspicious.
His comments to the RIAA included, "We passed the DMCA. We
gave you a lot of what you wanted. You told us without it you
wouldn't put your content out. What's going on? Are you leveraging
your copyrights to impede distribution rather than enhancedistribution?",130
In the midst of this, the unthinkable happened in October 2000.
Entertainment giant, Bertelsmann A.G. (BMG), suddenly broke
ranks with RIAA members, and announced that it would form a
strategic alliance with the RIAA's nemesis itself - Napster. The race
was on. By now music moguls understood quite well the enormous
economic potential online music services offered-especially if one
already held the sound recording rights and didn't have to worry
about the compulsory licensing fees or restrictions currently
surrounding webcasting.132 Record labels immediately began planning
online subscription services that would feature the works of their
signed artists.
Only one thing stood in the way. Record companies, as copyright
holders of the sound recordings, did not need to pay this particular
licensing fee. It was clear, however, that if they wished to get into the
on-line music game, then they too would have to pay royalty fees for
the underlying musical works. This meant that publishers, once their
allies in the legal battles against broadcasters, now stood in the way of
unmitigated profit. The NMPA and SGA suddenly found themselves
on the opposite side of the fence from the RIAA.
Within one month, RIAA negotiations with publishers over
subscription service fees had broken down.133 On November 29, 2000,
the RIAA again petitioned the Copyright Office, this time with a
request for a rulemaking regarding fees payable to publishers for on-
line subscription services. 3 The RIAA, now sounding very much like
129. Webcasters Caught in RIAA Web, supra at n. 27; Webcaster Goes Intellectual,
supra n. 27.
130. Webcaster Goes Intellectual, supra n. 27.
131. Norton, supra n.2.
132. Id.
133. Webcasters Caught in RIAA Web, supra at n. 27; Webcaster Goes Intellectual,
supra at n. 27.
134. Before the Copyright Office, Library of Congress: In re: Application of the
Mechanical Compulsory License to Certain Digital Music Services (Nov. 22, 2000); see
also Tech Law Journal (available at <http://www.techlawjournal.com/agencies/loc/riaa/
20001129.asp>); Brian Krebs, RIAA Ask; Copyright Office to Arbitrate Royalty Agreement
<http://www.computeruser.com/clickit/printout/news/300785400003341120.html>
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the webcasters it had been fighting just a few months before, wanted
to know how much it should pay publishers to use their compositions
as part of subscription music services, including on-demand streaming
and downloadable music services and what licenses, if any, were
needed."'
In a strange twist, the RIAA was suddenly allied with
webcasters-in particular, on-line music vendor MP3.com-and
asking the Copyright Office to approve a "safe harbor" approach to
royalties for downloaded music. 136 Such a plan would allow the
Copyright Office to set compulsory licenses for digital content but
defer setting the royalty rate.'37 This action infuriated publishers and
songwriters; they immediately argued that such an approach would
take away their right to negotiate licenses on their own terms.3 3 As
journalist Jay Kumar wryly noted, "The petition calls attention to an
interesting juxtaposition for the recording industry. When negotiating
licenses with competing webcasters, the record companies try to get
the highest rate possible for use of the songs. But as record labels
negotiate how much to pay publishers, they are fighting for as low a
rate as they can."'39
Shortly before the New Year, on December 11, 2000, the
Copyright Office issued a set of rulings that it hoped would resolve
the questions posed throughout the past year. 40 First, it amended its
regulations, ruling that radio broadcasters were not exempt from
paying the licensing royalties when they simulcast their programs
over the Internet. They are subject to a compulsory license and
subject to the sound recording copyright owner's exclusive right to
perform the work publicly by means of digital audio transmissions.
These rates would be determined sometime in 2001.'' This essentially
(accessed Dec. 1, 2000); Jay Kumar, RIAA Wants Government to Determine Royalty
Rates? <http://www.au.knac.com/servlet/Article-Page?articlelD=8476> (accessed Dec. 3,
2000).
135. Id.
136. Krebs, supra n. 33.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Kumar, supra n. 133.
140. 65 Fed. Reg. 77292, 77292-77293, (Dec. 11, 2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 77330, 77330
(Dec. 11, 2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 78434, 78434 (Dec. 15, 2000); Sue Zeidler, Recording
Industry Scores Win with Copyright Office <http://www2.infoworld.com/articles/hn/
xml/00/12/08/001208hncopyright.x.../printfriendly.htm> (accessed Dec. 8, 2000).
141. Section 114(d)(1)(A) of Title 17 exempts non-interactive performances of a
sound recording by means of a digital audio transmission from the sound recording
copyright owner's exclusive rights when the performance is part of a "nonsubscription
broadcast transmission [under § 114(j)(3)] made by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed
leveled the playing field between all broadcasters, terrestrial or web-
only. ny party streaming digital audio transmissions over the Internet
would now have to pay both the licensing fees for the underlying
musical work and for the sound recording.42
Jonathan Potter, Executive Director of DiMA, put a positive
spin on this decision, reminding members that the ruling came as no
surprise and that it provided more in common now between
webcasters and radio broadcasters. Their combined strength could be
utilized to build Internet radio, fight piracy, and change those DMCA
restrictions that prejudiced broadcast practices.1 "From our
perspective," he commented, "there needs to be a level playing field
in the Internet media world. Our competition is all media-TV,
Radio, and other Webcasts. It's bad that a terrestrial broadcaster does
not have to pay the same fee as does online Radio. It's an equities
argument. ,,144
Next, regarding DiMA's April 17th petition14 on interactive use,
the Copyright Office agreed with the RIAA, stating that, "[t]here is
no discernable dispute on this point."'46 It did recognize, however,
that the "amount and type of influence a consumer has on the
programming offered by the transmitting entity will affect whether
the activity is characterized as interactive or non-interactive.' 47 On
this point, the Office acknowledged that certain consumer-influenced
(i.e., interactive) webcasting could fall within the statutory licensing
requirements, but determined that it would be unable to fashion a set
of criteria or guidelines beyond those already set forth in the law.
The Copyright Office stated that the marketplace was the correct
place to decide that issue. 49Finally, the Copyright Office announced that the Library of
as such by the FCC." See Zeidler, supra n. 139.
142. See e.g. Wyllie, supra n. 24. However, ordinary terrestrial radio broadcasts would
maintain the status quo; licensing fees would continue to be paid only to the copyright
holder of the musical work-not the sound recording. In other words, radio stations would
continue to pay ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC on behalf of publishers and songwriters, but
not the RIAA for the record labels. Id.
143. Jonathan Potter, Broadcasters Must Pay the Piper to Stream Now that the Playing
Field is Even <http://www.radioink.com/viewentry.asp?ID=92531&PT+More%20
Articles> (accessed Jan. 8, 2001).
144. Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
145. See Recording Industry Scores Big, supra n. 139.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 65 Fed. Reg. 77292, 77292-77293, (Dec. 11, 2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 77330, 77330
(Dec. 11, 2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 78434, 78434 (Dec, 15, 2000); Zeidler, supra n. 139.
149. Id.
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Congress had ordered the consolidation of the CARP proceedings5 °
to establish rates and terms for: (1) October 28, 1998, through
December 31, 2000, and (2) January 1, 2001, through December 31,
2002, for the statutory licenses that allow public performances of
sound recordings by means of eligible nonsubscription transmissions,
and the making of an ephemeral phonorecord of a sound recording in
furtherance of making a permitted public performance of the sound
recording."'
That said, the brawling music industry parties were not about to
end the year quietly. At the eleventh hour on Christmas Eve,
December 24, 2000, one last petition was filed with the Copyright
Office.112 This time it was the publishers and songwriters-NMPA and
SGA-seeking to establish royalty rates for recordings and asking
that a distinction be made between music that is streamed for
temporary use and that which is downloaded and stored by
consumers.'53 We are not sure, however, whether anyone at the
Copyright Office happened to read the petition that same day it was
filed.
VI
Chapter Six: The Year 2001: More Warfare with Some
Attempts at Peace
After the holiday season, the parties picked up in 2001 almost
immediately where they had left off in 2000. On January 8th,
MP3.com filed comments with the Copyright Office "supporting an
RIAA request that the office conduct an inquiry regarding the
application of the Copyright Act to the delivery of music over the
Internet.""' 4 In a slightly different twist, MP3.com also indicated
concern that the current law did not address the consumer's interest
in receiving Internet transmissions.' Its submission asked the
Copyright Office to consider things such as whether "internet services
which allow consumers to enjoy online performances of the CDs they
have purchased are distinguishable from other music streaming and
download services that may be liable for copyright royalty payments
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Music Target Timeline, WebRadio News <http://www.musictarget.com/
webradionews.shtml> (accessed July 23, 2001) [hereinafter WebRadio News].
153. WebRadio News, supra n. 151.
154. John Townley, MP3.com Backs Copyright Office Inquiry <http://
www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article/,,3_553361,00.html> (Jan. 8, 2001).
155. Id.
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under current law." '156 MP3.com asked the Office to convene a CARP
to determine the appropriate level of royalty fees, if any, payable by
Internet music services when they deliver on-line music.
The broadcasters also wasted no time striking back. On January
25th, NAB, CBS's Infinity Broadcasting, and Cox Communications,
among others, filed suit in a New York federal district court in an
effort to overturn the Copyright Office's December 11, 2000 ruling
requiring them to pay licensing fees to the RIAA for broadcasting
music over the web.1 58 Their arguments were simple: the ruling made
it expensive for broadcasters to put music over the web; it was unfair
to web-only broadcasters who always had to pay two licensing fees,
versus terrestrial broadcasters who, unless offering a web simulcast,
only had to pay one licensing fee; and it essentially put everyone in
the broadcasting industry at the mercy of the RIAA"9 The Copyright
Office responded that it had expected the suit and would defend its
ruling,1 but cancelled the arbitration hearing scheduled for February
5, 2001.6
NAB's sudden change of heart towards web-only transmitters
did not go unnoticed. Attorney Mark Radcliffe commented, "It's
likely the entire battle now being waged could have easily been
averted if all sides had sat down at a table at the time the DMCA was
written to negotiate terms that benefited all sides." '162
DiMA's Jonathan Potter was more pointed:
Two and a half years ao the NAB specifically went out of
its way to support provisions that were harmful to webcast-
ing because the NAB viewed itself as the National Associa-
tion of Terrestrial Broadcasters. They didn't view their
members as media companies who are going to take advan-
tage of all types of media-they viewed their members as
traditional broadcasters.. .When your members go out to
try to do non-FCC-licensed transmissions, and you've par-
ticipated in the development of bad rules that are aimed at
non-FFC-licensed transmissions, then you've really just got-
ten what's coming to you. Had the NAB sided with DiMA
at the time, we could have avoided any compulsory license
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Radio Stations Sue, supra n. 28.; Wyllie, supra n. 24; Potters, supra n. 142.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
162. Wyllie, supra n. 24.
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at all.'63
He also offered the following explanation:
Radio stations are used to having preferred status, due to
their FCC license .... The NAB did not fight on behalf of
webcasting because they didn't realize their members would
be in the webcasting business ... They fought against
webcasting and failed to protect the interests of their radio
station members who were in the streaming business.
Dave Rahn of SBR Creative Media, wryly mused that:
The average person at a radio station, or even the general
manager really had no idea that any of this stuff was going
on. They didn't know there was all this legislation in place
that could potentially end up costing stations a lot of money
in terms of licensing fees. So, it's sort of a wake-up call. This
ruling has brought the issue of the copyright laws, as they
relate to Internet streaming, to the forefront for broadcast-165
ers.
"It's really messy," agreed Jack Moffitt, Vice President of
Technology at iCast. "It takes two or three lawyers to figure out if
what you're doing is legal, and even then [the RIAA] may come
knocking on your door.', 166 The RIAA, in the meantime, presented an
air of detached calm. Chief Hillary Rosen simply responded that she
was confident the RIAA would prevail. 67
In mid-February, the RIAA, in fact, did win another battle-this
time on a related front. The Court of Appeals held that Napster
would be liable for the copyright infringement of its users, to the
extent that it knew about their actions.' 68 Not everyone was pleased
by the decision. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) described his
"gnawing concern that this legal victory for the record labels may
prove Pyrric and shortsighted from a policy perspective,"'69 and
163. Id.
164. Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
165. Billboard, SBR Creative Media's Rahn Sees Radio's Future in Web-Site Side
Channels <http://www.customchannels.net/subpages/subpages2/BillboardArticle.htm>
(Jan. 5, 2001).
166. Jones, supra n. 27.
167. Bonisteel, supra n. 28.
168. Snyder, supra n. 4.
169. Id.
promised to convene Senate Judiciary Hearings on digital music."'
The Copyright Office, in the meantime, requested public
comments, on March 6,2001, regarding the latest petitions submitted
by the RIAA and MP3.com; specifically, an interpretation of the
mechanical and digital phonorecord compulsory license to certain
digital music services, as well as a determination of the meaning of an
incidental DPD (ephemeral recording) under Section 115.171
April proved to be a busy month: first, the Senate Judiciary
Hearings on digital music began. The labels were immediately
criticized for "moving slowly into online music and failing to license
music to smaller competitors.' 7  Mike Farrace, a senior vice president
at Tower Records, leveled the charge that the labels' new services
could "ultimately steal our business" and testified that "the deals the
record companies seem most interested in pursuing are with each
other, or with companies that they all buy a piece of-like
MusicNet.', 7 3 As Aaron Pressmen commented, "[N]one of the
independent web services had access to much of the popular music
that made Napster an Internet sensation." '74 The RIAA responded
that what appeared to be stalling was merely the working out of how
to protect, and receive payment for, online music while it negotiated
terms with publishers."'
Napster, in the meantime, under court supervision, found itself
upbraided for its "disgraceful" efforts to block unauthorized music
trading. No sooner was the charge made, it immediately acquired the
file technology of Gigabeat to better block copyrighted songs from its
database.'76 The major entertainment players, in the meantime, all of
170. The hearings were scheduled to begin in April 2001. Id.
171. The request was published on March 6, 2001, centering again over the
interpretation of section 115 of Title 17. "However, Congress did not define what
constitutes an incidental DPD, and that omission is the source of today's Notice of
Inquiry... Assuming that the Copyright Office does have the authority to act, and
assuming that a rulemaking proceedings is the best forum, the RIAA and MP3.com
petitions raise a number of questions. Central to RIAA's petition is a determination of the
meaning of an incidental DPD under section 115." 66 Fed. Reg. 14099, 14099 (37 C.FR. §
255) (Mar. 9, 2001); see also BNA's Patent, Trademark & Copyright Journal, vol. 61, no.
1515 (Mar. 16,2001).
172. Anna Wilde Mathews & John R. Wilke. U.S. Probes Online-Music Ventures for
Possible 'Distribution Duopoly," The Wall Street Journal A3 (Aug. 6, 2001).
173. Mathews & Wilke, supra n. 171, at 3.
174. See Aaron Pressman, Justice Department Shines Its Antitrust Spotlight on Music
Labels <http://www.thestandard.com/rticle/0.1902,29490,00.html> (accessed Aug. 6, 2001),
[hereinafter Justice Department Shines Its Antitrust Spotlight] (later implications of this
venture).
175. See Mathews & Wilke, supra n. 171 (discussion of implications).
176. Snyder, supra n. 4.
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which had been watching and learning from the Napster debacle-
and confident of RIAA support-were preparing now to usher in
their own on-line music revolution. RealNetworks, EMI, BMG, and
Warner announced a subscription service named MusicNet; Viacom's
MTVi would soon offer a streaming/digital download service in
conjunction with all five of the major labels; and even Microsoft
prepared a statement that it, too, would be getting into the digital
music game. 77 Although eager to begin, the major parties realized
that an old stumbling block still stood in the way of progress: no one
had yet given the Copyright Office a proposal for the actual royalty
rates, payable under the compulsory license, for music streamed on-
line. Suddenly, old enemies-DiMA, NAB and RIAA-were
working together on the same problem.
This issue had both radio and Internet broadcasters worried;
fees, at whatever rate, would be calculated back to the earlier of
October of 1998 or when the station first began streaming. A number
of models were possible: pay-per-play, pay-per-song-per-stream,
percentage of revenue, or a combination. Worse, radio stations
argued, no one ordered them to keep data from 1998; thus, how could
a retroactive fee be accurately reconstructed?"' s Speculations soon
began based on known rates for other licenses: ASCAP and BMI
were charging approximately 3.5% of gross revenues for musical
work licenses, and the sound recording license fees charged to DMX
and Music Choice approximated 6.5% of gross revenues.179
On April 11, 2001, DiMA, with its key members RealNetworks,
AOL, and MTVi, and the RIAA, made up of Universal, Sony,
Warner, EMI, and BMG, unveiled contrasting plans for setting the
royalty rates.'O Both proposals were submitted to the Copyright
Office with the understanding that, whichever was approved would be
retroactive, back to October 1998. Under the DiMA plan,
webcaster/on-line radio stations would pay $0.0022 per listener hour
177. Id. The premise for the major labels' proposed systems was simple: users would
sign up, purchasing the right to download a preset number of songs to their computers'
hard drives, accessing a preset number of other, streamed songs which could be heard but
not stored for later playback; initially, downloaded songs would not be able to transfer to
portable MP3 players. Access to download songs would be granted so long as the user
remained a subscriber; if the subscription lapsed, a time-based lock would activate.
Suzanne Kantra Kirschner, MP3: Just Press Pay, Popular Science 67, 67 (Sept. 2001).
178. Ryan & Bingaman, supra n. 13.
179. Id.
180. See Glasner, supra n. 39; Sam Costello, DiMA Addresses Webcasting Royalties
<http://www.cnn.com/200l/TECH/industry/04/13/webcasting.royalties.idg/> (accessed Apr.
11,2001).
to cover performance right fees for use of the sound recording. ' This
number was derived by economist, Adam Jaffe, who based it relative
to what terrestrial radio stations were paying ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC for use of the underlying musical work (approximately 2% of
gross revenues). 82
Under the RIAA's plan, webcasters would pay considerably
more: either $0.004 cents for each song streamed (or, revised later,
15% of the service's gross revenues from such transmissions).' The
RIAA claimed its rates were based on fees it had previously
negotiated with twenty-five individual webcasters.1'
Dave Rahn provided calculations to illustrate the vast difference
in fees under each plan. Assuming a hypothetical webcast that played
ten songs per hour, with 10,000 listeners each spending ten hours per
month with the stream, at $0.0015 per listener hour, webcasters would
pay $150.00 per month, or $1,800.00 per year, under the DiMA plan.
Under the RIAA plan, $0.004 per song streamed would amount to
$4,000 per month, or $48,000.00 per year.
85
Rahn then provided an illustration using an existing, highly-
successful alternative radio station in a top 20 market. Using data
from Arbitron, the station had 19,400 Average Hour Listeners, with
11 songs played per hour, on average. The station billed an average of
$11,000,000 per year in advertising revenue. Under the proposed
plans, yearly royalties owed would amount to $191,187.00 under
DiMA's proposal, and an astonishing $5,608,152.00 (51% of revenue)
under the RIAA's plan.
8 6
As Rahn concluded, "It begs the question, if the rates proposed
by the RIAA would put the 80-year, established, fully-consolidated
profitable RADIO industry out of business, how could they possible
make sense for the fledgling Webcasting business? '."..
In the meantime, another problem struck the broadcasting
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Licensing and Royalties, supra n. 19; Glasner, supra n. 39; Costello, supra
nn.179-80.
184. Id.
185. DiMA: 100,000 Listener Hours times $.0015 per listener hour = $150 ($1800 per
year); RIAA: 1,000,000 songs streamed times $.004 per song streamed = $4,000 ($48,000
per year). Dave Rahn, Webcasters Royalty Update-Custom Channels' Observations
<http://www.customchannels.net> (accessed Aug. 8, 2001).
186. DiMA: 19,400 listener hours times 6,570 hours per year (6a-mid) times $.0015 =
$191,187; RIAA: 19,500 listener hours times 11 songs per hour times 6,570 hours per year
(6a-mid) times $.004 per song = $5,608,152 (or about 51% of revenue). Id.
187. Id.
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industry: AFTRA" 8 entered the fray, to the chagrin of the
broadcasting industry, demanding royalties from them for its
members, as well.'89 Its argument was straightforward: if record
companies were now going to receive royalties for webcasts, then
what about the actors or singers heard on webcast commercials? On
April 10th, Clear Channel Internet Group, the online arm of Clear
Channel Communications, one of the largest radio station operators
in the United States, announced it would halt audio streaming on all
of its radio station websites" Streams would be put back, it said,
"when it makes legal and financial sense.'' 91 Smaller webcasters
would begin shutting down, as well.'92
The media moguls, in the meantime, were jockeying for position
at the on-line starting gate. Some more challengers were gearing up
for another round against them, although the impact, for the moment,
seemed doubtful. On May 23, 2001, the National Association of
Recording Merchandisers (NARM) and the Video Software Dealers
Association (VSDA) submitted Reply Comments to the Copyright
Office's request of March 6th.'93 Both argued that the RIAA's
position was fallacious regarding limited downloads.'94 Additional
comments were also filed jointly by the publisher/songwriter camp,
NMPA and SGA, asking the Copyright Office to convene a CARP to
set the terms and rates that should apply to online music services and
reject the RIAA's proposal to impose a moratorium on royalty
payments for songs downloaded over the Internet.9 In addition, they
argued that the Copyright Office lacked authority to change the
existing licensing or royalty payments scheme. 96
During the last week of May, however, the RIAA-along with its
entertainment mogul contingency-was probably too busy to notice;
the RIAA, in fact, was busy dealing more blows to online rivals,
particularly those offering interactive music services.97 First, it
188. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists.
189. WebRadio News, supra n. 151.
190. Glasner, supra n. 39.
191. Id.
192. See e.g. Reuters, supra n. 38; WebRadio to Shut Down, supra n. 38.
193. In re: Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Compulsory License,
Docket No. RM 2000-7 (May 23, 2001) (Reply Comments of National Association of




197. The RIAA, incidentally, did not confine its legal attacks to the music industry; in
April, it challenged academe as well. The RIAA sent Princeton professor Edward Felten a
brought suit against music portal Launch Media for allegedly failing
to seek proper licenses for its personalized web radio service.'98 The
complaint argued that the webcasts violated copyright law "by
offering streaming music services that allowed customers to skip
through songs and choose what types of music they preferred to
hear."' Launch Media, apparently, was too interactive for the
RIAA's tastes. Not surprisingly, Launch removed LaunchCast from
its web site in response to the suit and immediately entered into
settlement negotiations, amidst media response that independent
webcasters were being knuckled under by the RIAA' Next, the
RIAA petitioned the Copyright Office asking that personalized-
internet radio service webcasters be disqualified from the royalty
arbitration."' Finally, it brought legal action against file-sharing
Napster-clone, Aimster, arguing that it aided copyright
infringement.02 (In April, Aimster had taken the offensive against the
RIAA, bringing a pre-emptive suit in which it asked the court for a
declaratory ruling that it was not responsible for its users' copyright
infringements .203)
The RIAA-supported major labels lost no time taking more on-
line initiative: Bertelsmann announced it would acquire Myplay.com,
and Vivendi Universal bought MP3.com, Emusic, and half of the
music portal GetMusic. 2'  A week later, executives from
RealNetworks (whose MusicNet technology led to the collaboration
with AOL Time Warner, EMI and BMG) and Universal's MP3.com
attended a Congressional hearing in which they stunned certain
members of Congress and the media by pointedly asking legislators to
change the copyright law in their favor °.2 5 The hearing focused
letter threatening "enforcement actions" under the DMCA if his team published a paper
explaining how they cracked the codes developed by Secure Digital Music Initiative
(SDMI). Snyder, supra n. 4. Of interest, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EEF)
brought suit against the RIAA, on Felten's behalf. Id. The Princeton professor quipped
that the RIAA's effort to ban his research results, relying on the DMCA, was akin to a
hypothetical law that outlawed brickmaking since bricks could be used to hit people. He
renamed the DMCA the "Detached Masonry Control Act." Powers, supra n. 112.
198. Reuters, supra n. 112.
199. King, supra n. 36.
200. Reuters, supra n. 112.
201. Id.; Snyder, supra n. 4.
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205. Paul A. Greenberg, Online Music Execs Ask Washington to Bend the Rules
<http://www.radiohorizon.com/index.php3?fcn=displayarticle&id=1767> (June 7, 2001)
[hereinafter Online Music Execs Ask Washington to Bend the Rules].
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primarily on the battlefront between publisher/songwriter rights, who
were urging Congress not to become part of a "music giveaway," and
those of interactive, online music providers not eligible for the
compulsory license. In essence, MP3.com executive, Robin Richards,
told Congress that, without a compulsory license, the task of securing
permission from, and negotiating with, all of the various
songwriters/publishers who held copyrights on the underlying musical
works would be too hard for interactive webcasters to do.2 °6 His
solution called for the government to dictate a flat fee per song to be
used as a royalty rate. 7 Not all legislators felt sorry; one quipped that
he would also like to be guaranteed a flat fee for gasoline prices. 8
In the meantime, a new campaign was brewing, this one led by
DiMA. Angered by the RIAA's attack on Launch Media, several
non-label affiliated web stations, including Launch Media, Inc., MTVi
Group, MusicMatch, Inc., and Listen.com along with Xact Radio
LLC and DiMA, filed a countersuit on June 1, 2001, against the
RIAA in federal court in San Francisco.2°9 They asked the court to
issue a declaratory ruling on the definition of "interactivity," in an
effort to allow interactive stations the ability to participate in the
copyright arbitration hearing and, perhaps, seek a compulsory license
as well.210
Immediately, the RIAA argued that the countersuit was trying to
"improperly shoehorn personalized radio services into the
proceeding, which was intended to focus on rates for plain vanilla
Web radio. 2 . In retaliation, three days later the RIAA filed three
separate complaints against MTVi, MusicMatch and Xact Radio, in a
New York federal court.2 12 The suit asked that the actions be
consolidated under one judge-in New York-a move that DiMA
and the webcasters had hoped to avoid when filing in their native
California. "
By June 11th, on-line music provider, Listen.com, had
capitulated. Listen.com dropped its suit against the RIAA and agreed
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able to participate in the upcoming royalty rate agreement hearings.1
The opening date for the hearings was set for July 30, 2001.215
As the July 30th hearing date grew closer, July proved to be a
mixed month: at the Digital Music Conference, "Plug-In," held in
New York, Universal announced that its PressPlay system, jointly
owned with Sony, would go active in September. This announcement
was made despite the fact that no agreement had yet been reached
with the publishers and songwriters over licensing fees for the online
216
service. On July 19th, despite the RIAA's objections, the Copyright
Office ruled that interactive web music providers would be allowed to
participate in the arbitration hearings regarding royalty rates."7 For
some smaller webcasting services, however, it was already too late: on
July 23rd, Thomas Baxter resigned as CEO of Audible, an internet
audio service, and announced that the company would downsize218; on
July 25th, WebRadio announced that it would shut down on August
31 219
As the industry stood poised in anticipation of the long-awaited
CARP, it was clear that the music industry was still in a state of
fracture. Broadcasters-both radio and Internet-along with the
recording industry had turned on songwriters and publishers;
broadcasters had turned on each other, "terracasters" versus
"webcasters"; webcasters had splintered over interactive versus non-
interactive; small webcasters had been devoured by large ones or
pressured out by escalating legal and financial worries; and the major
labels and software giants rode the coat tails of smaller entrepreneurs
who had taken a chance on a new technology. Dazzled by dreams of
profit from the online music promise, the music industry behaved
shamefully.
On July 30, 2001, the CARP proceedings were slated to begin.
220
As of that date, the following issues existed:
1) The DMCA amendments related to webcasting were added,
without House or Senate discussion, by committee in what was a last-
minute decision; as a result, certain parties present did not have an
adequate opportunity to prepare, speak or consider the matter in
depth;
214. Id.; Snyder, supra n. 4.
215. Costello, supra n. 179.
216. King, supra n. 6.
217. WebRadio News, supra n. 151.
218. Reuters, supra n. 38.
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20011
38 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [24:1
2) the recording industry was granted limited antitrust
exemptions to pursue licensing agreements with webcasters, while
allowed to conduct individual negotiations with webcasters without
having to disclose terms;
221
3) the RIAA desired to charge licensing fees for the sound
recordings far in excess of those received for the underlying musical
work; for purposes of performance fees, the recording of a song
should not be unreasonably disparate from the creation of that song;
4) the assessment of fees retroactive to October 1998 appeared
unreasonable when a) the RIAA participated in the confusion
resulting in the Copyright Office's inability to set the rate in a timely
manner, and b) broadcasters did not receive adequate notice of any
requirement to maintain records regarding such webcasts, thereby
making it difficult to compute actual fees owed; and
5) the DMCA imposed unreasonable restrictions upon
broadcasters hoping to qualify for the compulsory license, a measure
which impeded competition and worked to quash a developing
industry and technology.222
The real question now, of course, was what sort of amendment to
the DMCA and/or imposed statutory rate could fix a wound that had
penetrated so deeply since October 1998.
221. Stanford Law School professor, Lawerence Lessig, wrote:
[The labels] have no intention of allowing innovation in a means of
distribution that they can't control ... Congress should listen to
what the market says. When innovators controlled the future of
online music, billions flowed into that market. Once the courts
made it clear that dinosaurs were in control, billions quickly
evaporated. Congress could flip this market around in a single
legislative stroke: Pass a law setting compulsory rates for
Webcasting of whatever form, as well as rates for downloading and
distributing music.
Lawrence Lessig Artful Dodges <http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,26946,00.
html> (June 11, 2001).
222. In 1984, the United States Supreme Court stated, "[The law] has never accorded
the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his work." Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984). In Tricom, Inc. v. Electronic
Data Systems Corp., the Court of Appeals held that "[a] copyright owner may not enforce
its copyright to ... use it in any manner violative of the public policy embodied in the
grant of a copyright." 902 F. Supp. 741, 745 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (citations omitted). Finally,
courts condemned the practice of leveraging copyright power to control behavior not
intended by Congress in cases such as United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131 (1948), and Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F. 2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
VII
Chapter Seven: A Still-Open Book: The Music Online
Competition Act ("MOCA") and the Department of Justice
Appear on the Horizon
On August 3, 2001, industry headlines broke with an amazing
story. Rep. Chris Cannon (R-Utah) and Rep. Rick Boucher (D-
Virginia) unveiled their sponsorship of a new bill that would rewrite
the music licensing and copyright laws, promote competition among
online music service providers, and simplify the buying and selling of
digital music.223 Chris Cannon said in a statement that he had
"watched with dismay as companies such as Musicmaker.com and
Riffage.com, which tried to distribute licensed music via the Internet,
have gone out of business, often because they could not get content
from the labels or the publishers." '224 Regarding the major labels, he
added, "They want to be the owner of the content, the producer, the
wholesaler, and the record store online. And with cross-licensing
agreements, they are in a position to leverage their collective market
power to the exclusion of the competition." '225
The proposed Act, MOCA, directly addresses the most difficult
issues. The proposed Act offers the following: first, users would be
allowed to make backup copies of legally-acquired music files to
protect mishaps such as computer crashes. 6 Second, as opposed to
the DMCA which severely limits the number of ephemeral copies
allowed for servers and efficient online transmission, online
distributors would now be able to create multiple ephemeral
recordings. 7 Third, online providers could go to the Copyright Office
to seek licenses rather than obtaining clear publishing rights from
songwriters directly. 8 Fourth, the bill addresses the legal dispute
between the publishers and RIAA over royalty payments by
channeling those payments directly to the artists who are currently
paid by the record companies. 9 In addition, the major labels, which
entered into their online ventures with other firms, would have to
223. Letitia Stein, Online Music Legislation Would Promote Competition
<http://investor.cnet.con/investor/news/nevsitem/0-9900-1028-6772782-O.html> (Aug. 3,
2001) [hereinafter Online Music Legislation].
224.. Reuters, U.S. Antitrust Regulators Eye Online Music Ventures <http://
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make similar terms available to independent online music
distributors. In essence, the labels would be obliged to license their
online music to smaller competitors on terms similar to those they
would grant to their own digital distributors.23 °
Cannon also expressed his opposition to the compulsory license,
viewing it as only applicable "as an absolute last resort."23' Rather, he
envisioned a competitive market in which consumers would pay a
moderate sum such as five to ten dollars per month to use online
music swapping sites like Napster.232
The RIAA complained immediately that the bill was "essentially
a solution-a very bad solution-in search of a problem." '233 Director
Hillary Rosen argued that the new bill "substitutes government
regulation for the marketplace," stating that "the marketplace is
already moving in the right direction" as consumers "will be served
well by both current and coming plans for online music services." '234
DiMA, on the other hand, voiced its support, as well as Napster,
which said the bill "offered needed direction for the embattled
industry.""23 Manus Cooney, Napster's Vice President for Corporate
and Public Policy Development, commented, "When the legislative
process is completed, we hope that MOCA will be the cup of coffee
that this nascent industry sorely needs.,
236
During the announcement of MOCA, Representatives Cannon
and Boucher made a portentious remark about the major labels' two
upcoming collaborative online services set to debut in September of
2001. Although they "lauded the upcoming launch of MusicNet and
Pressplay," the Congressmen feared that "the two services would
dominate the market., 237 Specifically, they worried about the
possibility that the two companies would enter into cross-licensing
agreements in order to share their huge catalogues fueled this
concern.
The next day, more news riveted the online-music community:
the U.S. Department of Justice launched a preliminary antitrust
230. Mathews & Wilke, supra n. 171.
231. Stein, supra n. 222.
232. Id.
233. Reuters, supra n. 223.
234. Id.
235. Stein, supra n. 222.
236. Id.
237. See IDG, Source: MusicNet, Pressplay Probe Began Months Ago <http://
www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,28532,00.html> (accessed Aug. 7, 2001); John
Borland, DOJ Interest Unlikely to Quiet Music Standoff <http://www.news.cnet.com/news/
0-202-6788999.html> (accessed Aug. 6, 2001).
investigation against the very same online providers, MusicNet 38 and
Pressplay. 39
Apparently, the Department of Justice had begun investigating
the proposed services for several months.20 A source close to the
investigation revealed that the Justice Department's antitrust division
responded as a result of "disillusionment with the business practices
of the record companies" from "multiple parties at every level of the
music value chain," including recording artists, retailers, and online
music services.241
Indeed, as early as June, the European Commission, the
executive body of the European Union, had already launched a probe
centering on potentially anti-competitive behavior by the five major
labels which, together, control eighty percent of the world's most
popular music. 22 Mario Monti, the European commissioner for
competition policy, revealed the investigations during a speech given
in Stockholm: "These are important cases for the development of
music services offered online to consumers, and there are potentially
a number of issues which merit close examination., 24 '3 He added that
consumer interest is clear and that online music services should
develop rapidly, "but with a diversity of service providers.
2 4
238. MusicNet is comprised of: AOL Time Warner Inc., Bertelsmann AG, EMI
Group PLC, and RealNetworks, Inc. Alec Klein & Jonathan Krim, Online Music Ventures
Probed: U.S. Opens Antitrust Inquiry into Major Firms' Partnerships, The Washington
Post E04 (Aug. 7, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 23185164).
239. Pressplay is comprised of: Sony Corp. and Vivendi Universal SA, working with
Microsoft Corp. Id. Operating under a concept similar to Napster, both online providers
would allow users to instantly download music, in exchange for a monthly fee. Id.
MusicNet and Pressplay had already announced several online partners, including AOL,
Napster, and RealNetworks (MusicNet), and Yahoo, MSN, and Mp3.com (Pressplay). Id.
Mathews & Wilke, supra n. 171. A source familiar with the Pressplay venture responded,
"We have been contacted by the [DOJ], be we don't know yet the scope of the
investigation. Obviously, it's not entirely unexpected that they would look at two joint
ventures by two competitors. It's not a shock." Id. Warner Music Group stated that it
planned on cooperating fully with the DOJ once they made a request. Id.
240. IDG, Source: MusicNet, Pressplay Probe Began Months Ago <http://
www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,28532,00.html> (Aug. 7, 2001) [hereinafter MusicNet,
Pressplay Probe]. "The government also is expected to examine the [labels'] use of
copyright rules and licensing practices to control online distribution of their music."
Mathews & Wilke, supra n. 171.
241. MusicNet, Pressplay Probe, supra n. 239.
242. Klein & Krim, supra n. 237.
243. Id.
244. Id.; see also Matt Richtel, Plans to Sell Music on the Internet Raise Antitrust
Concerns, The New York Times C4 (Aug. 7, 2001).




As of this writing (August 2001), a number of questions remain
open, reading like a veritable alphabet soup: the fate of the DMCA,
whether MOCA will pass muster, the results of the CARP, and the
DOJ investigation. The real issues, however, concern
how soon consumers will be able to enjoy a promising new
technology and whether any hope exists for venturesome, online
startups willing to compete with the major labels. Public debates on
MOCA are set to begin in the fall of 2001.245 It is hoped that this
article, as well as others, will raise public awareness such that those
interested in the music business will speak their minds for the benefit
of us all.
245. See e.g. Online Music Legislation, supra n. 222.
